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1.0 	 Introduction, Purpose and Scope
 
This document provides a description of the Apollo 13 Government-

Furnished Equipment (GFE) Corrective Action and Study Implementation
 
Panel Activities, a summary of the results of the various studies
 
undertaken, and the significant conclusions and recommendations
 
reached. The appendix contains the notes and reports generated
 
during the tenure of the team. Referrel documents; such as the
 
spacecraft stowage lists, operations handbook, and test documenta­
tion can 	be made available upon request. Copies of Failure Mode
 
and Effects Analysis (FMA)documents pertinent to specific life
 
support or survival equipment are available for review in the
 
office of the chairman.
 
2.0 	 Scope of MSc Apollo 13 GFE Investigation Team Activities
 
The scope of the GFE investigation is defined by the following
 
activity descriptions.
 
2.1 	 Pressure Vessel Data Accumulation
 
Compile a listing with pertinent design data for all government­
furnished equipment. This information is required to assist
 
the Investigation Team Panel No. 6 in its detailed investigation
 
of all Apollo pressure vessels.
 
2.2 	 Criticality Review
 
Review all GFE to determine those items which are presently
 
designated as Criticality I and to determine if any items
 
should be upgraded to Criticality I (See Criticality definitions
 
on page 6).
 
2.3 	 Detailed Investigation
 
Review the acceptability of the design of Criticality I equipment
 
items and make recommendations for design studies and/or changes.
 
2.4 	 Contingency Use Study
 
Review the need for adding contingency type equipment in either
 
spacecraft and determine feasibility of using existing equipment
 
for uses 	other than those for vhich it was designed.
 
2.5 	 Exclusion of Non-metallic Materials Review and Electronic Circuit
 
Analysis
 
Evaluation of GFEmaterials and electronic circuit elements will not
 
be considered during this investigation based on the extensive equip­
ment redevelopment which resulted from the Apollo 204 investigation.
 
The use of non-metallic materials, their proximity to ignition
 
sources and other safety aspects have been continually reviewed
 
by all levels of program management.
 
5 
3.0 Mode of Operation
 
The 	GFE investigation proceeded according to the following steps:
 
a. 	Review Failure Mode and Effects Analyses for adequacy and
 
completeness.
 
b. 	Re-examine the rationale for acceptance of single point
 
failures.
 
c. 	Review and submit recommendations for any proposed hardware
 
changes.
 
d. 	Provide all tank data and contingency use study results
 
to Panel No. 6 for further detailed investigation.
 
4.0 Study Results
 
Detailed reports prepared during the various studies are included
 
in the appendix. This section includes a summary of the results.
 
4.1 Pressure Vessel Data
 
A total of 7 types of high pressure tanks and cartridges were
 
identified in flight GFE. Of these, two are filled with 02 and
 
the rest contain C02, N2 or He. Detailed tank analysis is to be
 
conducted by the Systems Engineering Division. The raw data
 
collected by the GFE Team is included in the appendix. It should
 
be noted that electrical wiring is not contained in any of the
 
GFE pressure tanks.
 
4.2 Criticality Review
 
The total complement of Apollo GFE was reviewed by item to re­
evaluate presently established criticality ratings. No major
 
rating changes were required. The criteria used in determining
 
the criticality of equipment end items is shown in Table I,
 
page 6. Criticality I end items were then examined with regard
 
to the criticality ratings of the single point failure modes
 
inherent in the equipment. The criteria used for rating single
 
point failures of Criticality I end items is included in Table I.
 
Table II, page 6 is a compilation of the Criticality I and II
 
equipment items and Criticality I single point failure modes.
 
Ratings for all GFE are included in the appendix along with
 
an index to existing Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA)
 
documentation (see Section 6.2, page 21)
 
4.3 Life Support Systems Detailed Investigation
 
All GFE Criticality I End Items were included in The Life Support
 
Systems and detailed investigation was limited to this equipment.
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TABLE I 
GFE Criticality Rating Criteria 
Hardware (End Item) Criticality Classificaticn
 
I. Item necessary to sustain crewnan's life 
Ii. Item necessary to perform mission 
III. 	Other
 
Single Point Failure Criticality Classification
 
I. 	 Failure would cause loss of crewman's life 
II. 	 Failure would cause loss of mission or second
 
failure would causeloss of crewman's life
 
III. 	Other
 
TABLE 	 II 
GFE Criticality I and II Classifications
 
Criticality I Equipment Items 	 Criticality I Single Point 
Failure Modes 
1. Catastrophic leakage ofPressure Garment Assembly (PGA) 
pressure retention layer.
 
2. Catastrophic leakage of
 
IA connectors, zipper, wrist
 
disconnects, etc.
 
1. Catastrophic leakage throughPortable Life Support System (PLSS) 
the oxygen ventilation circuit.
 
2. Explosion of the Primary 
oxygen supply bottle. 
.Oxygen Purge System (OPS) 	 1. Explosion of the oxygen 
supply bottle. 
2. Catastrophic leakage through
 
the oxygen flow regulator bellows. 
3. Catastrophic leakage through 
the umbilical hose. 
Criticality II Equipment Items
 
Liquid Cooling Garment Communications Carrier
 
Oxygen Mask and Hose Assembly PISS LiOH Cartridge and Battery
 
Lunar Extravehicular Visor Assy
PISS Remote Control Unit 

Boots 	 Purge Valve AssemblyEV Gloves and Lunar 
Emergency Supply Umbilical
 
4.3.1 Portable Life Support System (PISS)
 
PLSS Criticality I single point failure modes consist of rupture
 
(explosion) of the primary oxygen supply (rOS) bottle causing
 
damage to the crewman or the rupture of any element in the oxygen
 
ventilation circuit resulting in premature loss of the oxygen
 
supply (see Figure 1, page8). Note that blockage of the venti­
lation circuit or inadvertant disconnection of a PISS umbilical
 
connector are not considered Criticality I failure modes because
 
of the backup protection of the Oxygen Purge System (OFS) and
 
the incorporation of self-sealing connectors in the PGA.
 
The ventilation circuit single point failure mode was incorporated
 
into the PISS because elimination would require a redundant venti­
lation circuit, redundant PGA interfaces, and complex crossover
 
valving which would yield unacceptable weight and volume growth
 
and an increase in potential failure points. The failure mode
 
has been accepted due to the reliable natureof the system components
 
and the extensive, stringent qualification and pre-flight testing
 
program to which the equipment is subjected. There have been no
 
instances recorded of incipient or actual failure in this mode of
 
the PLSS ventilation circuit.
 
The PISS primary oxygen supply bottle failure mode was accepted
 
in the basic design because no other means was feasible, within
 
weight/volume limitations, for the application. Qualification
 
test results indicate that the bottle design provides an actual
 
safety factor of 2.1, based on the ratio of the lowest actual
 
burst pressure recorded during test to the maximum operating
 
pressure possible during mission conditions. The PISS structure
 
plus an internal shield protects the bottle from damage from
 
external sources during pre-flight handling and during the
 
mission. There are no potential external or internal electrical
 
current inputs to the oxygen bottle. No failures of'the PISS
 
oxygen bottle have occurred.
 
4.3.2 Oxygen Purge System (OPS) 
The CriticAlity I single point failure modes of the OPS consist 
of explosion of the oxygen bottle causing damage to crewman or 
equipment, massive rupture of the flow regulator primary bellows 
permitting oxygen flow out of the suit through the OPS umbilical 
to vacuum, and rupture of the OPS umbilical again permitting 
oxygen loss (see Figure 2, page 9). 
The single point failure mode of the OFS oxygen bottle was accepted 
in the equipment design using the same rationale as was used for
 
the PISS oxygen bottle. Qualification test results indicate an
 
actual safety factor of 2.2. Again, the OPS structure protects
 
the bottle during handling or use, and no potential electrical
 
inputs to the bottle are found in the equipment after deletion
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of the regulator heater circuitry which was incorporated in OPS
 
units used on previous Apollo missions. There have been no
 
instances of failure of any OPS oxygen bottles to this point 
of the Apollo Program. 
The OPS regulator primary bellows rupture failure mode was accepted 
during OPS design due to the complexity of the equipment required 
for elimination. The added complexity would add several single 
point failures of a lower criticality and lead to lower overall 
equipment reliability. Component testing of the bellows indicates 
an actual safety factor of more than 10.0. This has been borne 
out by an extensive qualification test program. Each flight unit 
is also thoroughly tested at the component, subsystem and system 
level prior to committmentto flight. There have been no instances
 
of failuresrecorded against the bellows.
 
The OPS oxygen umbilical design has been accepted for the same 
reasons as the PISS umbilicals. i~o, failures have beeri detected 
during any test to this point in the program. 
4.3.3 Spacesuit - Pressure Garment Assembly (PGA) 
The PGA Criticality I single point failure modes consist of 
-rupture of the single layer pressure bladder, convolutes, or 
helmet; or high leakage rates (greater than the PTSS/OPS make­
up capability of 8#/hour or 44,400 scc/min) through the PGA 
closure mechanism the neck or glove connect rings, or the self 
sealing gas/liquid suit connectors. 
The noted failure modes were identified during PGA design and
 
development and were accepted due to the reliability character­
istics of the materials and mechanisms involved and because use
 
of redundancies in the pGA would effect mobility, bulk, and
 
comfort; equipment donning, doffing and hookup operations; ane
 
overall system reliability.
 
Justification for confidence in the PGA design, manufacture and 
test approach is available in the test data accumulated during 
the Apollo Program. Figure 3, page 11, provides a plot of the 
leakage rate history for 28 BGA's representing the worst cases 
of 115 controlled type flight suits that have been processed in 
Apollo to this point. Each point on the curve indicates the number 
of times that a leak rate of that magnitude was noted during a 
total of 579 individual leak rate tests. Of the 579 points, 
approximately 10% (59) of the points vere in the range above 
the PGA leak specification limit of 180 se/min and only 12 points 
were greater than 2000 scc/min (2000 scc/min is the flow rate 
from the PISS primary oxygen bottle which would trigger an alarm 
indicator to denote an excessive flow rate). One of those 12 points 
was greater than the naSS/oPS oxygen makeup capability. This 
failure is attributed to human error in that serious abrasion
 
of the protective patch over the shoulder convolute was noted
 
during unmanned testing but was permitted to continue until a
 
hole was worn through the pressure layer.
 
FIGURE 3 
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Leakage rates approaching the higher level rates indicated in
 
Figure 3 would never be permitted in PGA's to be used for an 
Apollo mission, and would be detected during the extensive pre­
installation acceptance (PIA) testing conducted at KSC in the
 
period just preceding the mission. Table III, page 13, provides
 
a compilation of the actual leakage characteristics of lOA ts
 
that have been used to this point in the Apollo earth orbital,
 
lunar orbital or lunar surface mission operations. Of the 39
 
test points shown, all are well within the 180 se/min sp&cifi­
cation except for data from two BOAts. A waiver for use of the
 
Command Module Pilot's PGA was granted for Apollo 9 because
 
previous test history of the unit indicated the absence of a
 
structural problem, the fact that the point of leakage was ­
traced to an area of the unit that was well protected, and tna:t
 
the 	measured rate was well below the mission critical level.
 
The 	excess leakage measured on the Apollo 12 Commander's POA
 
was 	traced to the right boot bladder, which was subjected to
 
abrasion from the right instep of the crewman during the mission.-

The 	boot bladder assembly has subsequently been redesigned to
 
improve service and reliability and the new design has been
 
incorporated into all Apollo flight POA's.
 
4.4 Contingency Equipment Use Study
 
A brief study was made of the potential contingency application
 
of stowed equipment aboard the CM or the LM. The results, which
 
have been transmitted to the Systems Engineering Division for
 
inclusion in an in depth review of contingency use modes, are
 
included in the appendix.
 
5,0 Findings, Conclusions, and Recommendations
 
The 	following findings, conclusions, and recommendations are
 
based on the results of the data review accomplished during the
 
GFE 	investigation panel activities.
 
5.1 Findings
 
a. 	There are no electrical circuits in any GFE pressure
 
vessels.
 
b. 	Pressure vessel design parameters are sufficient to provide 
a safety factor against explosive rupture of at least 2.0 
as determined by actual burst test results. 
c. 	The Failure Mode and Effects Analyses for Criticality I GFE 
end items have adequately considered all potential failure 
modes and the effects thereof. 
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TABLE III 
PRE- AND POST-FLIGHT LEAKAGE SUMMARY ASSOCIATED 
WITH APOLLO FLIGHT PRESSURE GARMENT ASSEMBLIES 
PRE-FLIGHT PGA POST-FLIGHT PGA 
FLIGHT CREWMAN IGA LEAKAGE (PTA) LEAKAGE 
NUBRSERIAL 	 NO. co/MmN. c/MmN. 
Apollo 7 	 CDR ATL-004 60 90 
CMP A7L-005 90 	 100 
LMP A7L-O06 125 	 265 
Apollo 8 	 CDR A7L-030 6o 50
 
CMP A7L-037 87 35 
IMP ATL-031 55 65 
Apollo 9 	 CDR ATL-O20 go 54
 
CMP ATL-O!9 ,, 200* 225 
IMP A7L-015 55 53 
Apollo 10 	 CDR ATL-047 60 75 
CMP A7L-0F3 108 75 
IMP A7L-O4 6o 75 
Apollo 11 	 CDR A7L-056 33 f17
 
CM? A7L-033 60 85
 
IMP A7L-O77 95 115
 
Apollo 12 	 CDR A7L-065 105 4oo**
 
CMP A7L-066 55 18
 
LMP ATL-O67 51 45
 
Apollo 13 	 CDR A7L-O_ 80-

CMP A7L-088 130
 
58 	 X*IMP ATL-O61 
* Flown on Waiver Number FLC 8812-4W-0240 
- Post-flight test failure - ME 03952
 
*** Data not available - PGA's yet to go post test. 
NOTE: 	 All data taken at sea level ambient conditions using 02 with PGA
 
pressurized to 5.75 psig.
 
a. The Criticality Ratings for GFE provide a conservative guide­
line for the identification of equipment necessary for crew
 
life support and mission completion.
 
e. 	The identification of Criticality I single point failure
 
modes in Criticality I end items is accurate and comprehen­
sive.
 
f. 	The rationale for acceptance of all Criticality I single
 
point failure modes in GFE life support equipment is adequate
 
and has been proven by sufficient test programs.
 
g. 	Test and mission use results have confirmed the reliability
 
of GFE life support equipment.
 
5.2 Conclusions
 
a. 	The present design of allrCriticality I flight GFE is
 
satisfactory to support dontinuation of the Apollo Program.
 
b. 	Existing manufacture, test and review procedures adequately
 
assure the provisioning of flight worthy equipment.
 
c. 	The existing life support equipment Criticality I single
 
point failures are acceptable due to the reliability and
 
safety margins available in the equipment.
 
5.3 Recommendations 
Based upon these conclusions it is recommended that no changes
 
to design, manufacture, test or review requirements be made
 
and that existing equipment continue to be used to support the
 
Apollo Program.
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6.0 - Appendix
 
6.1 Pressure Vessel Data
 
2
 (For PLSS/OPS pressure vessel data see Sec. 6.3, pages and 46).
 
TABLE Al
 
LUNAR ORBITAL EXPERIMENTS PRESSURE VESSEL DATA
 
EXPERIMENT CRITICALITY I FMIA PRESSURE VESSEL 
Gamma Ray Spectrometer No Completed None 
X-Ray/Alpha Spectrometer No Completed None 
Mass Spectrometer No In MSC Reviev None 
Panoramic Camera No Being Revised None* 
Mapping Camera No Being Revised None*** 
Laser Altimeter No Being Revised None** 
IR Scanning Radiometer No Required by FP? None 
Far UV Spectrometer No Required by FP None 
Subsatellite No Required by RFP Batteries 
*Contains N2 plumbing. Maximum pressure is 28 PSIG in camera. N2 supply provided by NR as CFE.
 
**Laser head contains one atmosphere of N2 . Volume is approximately 15 'cubic inches.
 
***May require N2 supply. If so, Mill utilize same supply as panoramic camera.
 
TABLE A2
 
LIST OF PRESSURE VESSELS-LUNAR SURFACE EXPERIENTS
 
Exp.- Subsystem Component 
PSE - Caging System 
.04-O.D. SS thin wall 
tubing 
Contra-' Approx. 
BxA 1.6 in.3 
I 
i Gas 
10% helium 
+nitrogen 
iDesign/Proof 
666/1000 PSIA 
Working 
333 PSI 
Relief 
No Yes 
AF-pollo'Fit 
Aimn 
All 
Outer Case - Soft Spun BxA 
aluminum Jx 
;10.75 Dia 
16.5" long Air 
I 
No !AmbientI . No Yes All 
Sampie Return Containers MSC !2 x 18 x I0 Vacuum /14.7 PSI 15.0 PSI No NO All 
LGEC - Pressure Bottle 
-Case 
Goerz 
Goerz 
!1in Dry Air 
14 x 6 x 5 Dry Air 
760 PSI 
1.5 PSI/ 
500 PSI 
1.5 PSI 1.5 PSI 
YES 
YES 
14 & Subq. 
14 & Subq. 
RTG. ABC :20 x 6.0-0.D. Argon' 
4.5-I.D. 
14.7 @ Ambient 25 @ 11000F No 
Static 
Yes All 
Drill 
- Fuel Element 
- Battery Cell 
AEC 18 x 2 Dia 
Martin 15 x 5 x 8 
Helium 
;Nitrogen 
i 
Ambient-1000 
-/20 PSI 
PSI After 
8- 3 PSI 
I + 
6 yrs. Yes 
8- PSI. Yes 
All 
16 
- Battery Case 
- Power Head 
'Martin l0 x 5 x 8 :Nitrogen 
Martin !14 x 8 Dia ;Nitrogen 
-/20 PSI 
-/60 PSI 
i5 -1/2 PSI 
+ 
15 - 2 PSI 
51/2 PSIes 
-L 
15 2 PS1 YesI 
16 
16 
CS*Components'." 
Reed Relays
TOS Relays 
BxA 
BxA 
S14.7I 
air 
, Air 
No14.7 
No 
PSI 
!14.7 PSI -
No 
-No 
No 
INo 
All 
All 
Capacitors BxA Air No -14.7 PSI No - No All 
*Central Station 
-.A 
i8
 
1. 	Fuel Capsule Assembly - FCA pressure is a time-dependent function
 
of the Pa-235 half-life and results from the creation of helium
 
atoms after alpha decay. The curve on page 19 shows pressure bild­
up as a function of years after FCA fueling. The curve is conserva­
tive since it assumes the formation of a pressure contributing helium
 
stom for each Pa-238 alpha disintegration and assumes 100% retention
 
of the helium. Considering the capsule clad strength, the curve
 
shows 3 to 4 year design lifetime margin for capsules thus far
 
fabricated (thru Apollo 16).
 
2. 	Generator Assembly - GA is hermetically sealed to retain an inert
 
(Argon) atmosphere for the thermoelements. The internal pressure of
 
GA is approximately 11 psia at 70°F (the conditions of pre-launch
 
storage and translunar mission prior to fueling). After generator
 
fueling on the lunar surface, the pressure stabilizes atA/25 psia
 
(at operating temperature).
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TABLE A3 - CREW EQUIPMNT PRESSURE VESSEL DATA
 
I IORMfL CeUAL -QTY TESSEL VESSEL DESXGN PREOSSUI OE.ATING FACTOR SAFFTY 1BI'UST 
, T 
ihr-e-.ai: Life SE40l 2 1 " long 301 4600 5600 1000 5.0 3.7 
...... ....J il/T EEO'DI ])ThlTON, 1'I'NIA], WOOF ]R ST PRESSURE ACTUAL TIEO, PRESS. . .CUR 
7500- Arcw'
Raft Cylinders Oo6- x stein- 7800 
203 2" dia. less 
steel 
IS 
D-j.cl Lif'e Vest SD!iO1 2 3" long Nickel X- 7000 8O0- 7.0 7,0 4 Kn,r-onarch 
00179- x plated 1000 minvCind.xer 001 0.75:' cia. 
 teol
 
" .--"m .. 
 301 
.d .:-:.1,c- Ardde' 5 long 301 6000 9000 3600 2.9 2.5 i0,600- Arde' 
Air Cylin- D 3703 2I x stain-'icr (:is2on dia, less 11,600
 
. C.. 7SE) steel
 
*OF-the-Shelf lOD item 
- not ali information available. 
Thcor -ieal Safoty Factor - Desigrn B'urst Pres-uro/M' ximm O)pratinig Pressure 
Actual Su' ty Rictor - hest A"ual Bvrot Prczaure/Naimn Operating Pressure 
I') 
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6.2 Criticality Review
 
TABLE A - GFE CRITICALITY RATINGS 
22 
ITEM NO. PART NUMBER NOMENCLATURE CAT 1MEA 
AOl0O SEB33l00100-209 Camera, i6mm Data III No 
Acquisition 
AOOl SEB33100125-203 Magazine, l6mm Data III No 
or -204 or -205 Acquisition 
A0102 SEB33100018-301 Lens, l8mm III No 
A0103 SEB33100019-302 Lens, 75mm III No 
A0lo4 SEB33100038-301 Cable, Power (DAC) III No 
AOlO6 SEB33100051-204 Mirror, Right Angle III No 
A0107 SEB331OO102-210 Camera, 70mm Electric III No 
Hasselblad 
AO108 SEB33100082-215 Magazine, Lunar Surface III No 
Hasselblad 
A0112 SEB12100018-202 -Kit, Pilots Preference III No 
A0113 SEB12100050-201 Tape III No 
AOl4 SKB32100083 File, Flight Data III No 
AOl5 SEB33100186-205 Exerciser, In-flight III No 
AOl7 SEB331000637301 Cover, Meter III No 
A0118 SEB33100063-302 Cover, Meter III No 
A0122 8EB3300104-201 Spotmeter, 1 Deg. III No 
Auto. 
AO324 SEB33100092-301 Timer, Interval III No 
2 Speed 
A0125 8EB32100095-305 Glare Shield, Floodlite III No 
A0126 SEB33100010-301 10mm Lens III No 
A0127 SEB33100262-302 Voice Recorder (with III No 
Cassette and Batteries) 
A0128 SEB33100263-302 Tape, Cassette III No 
A0129 SEB33100264-301 Battery, Voice Recorder III No 
A0130 SEB12100078-302 Monocular lOx4O III No 
or -303 
23 TABLE A4 (cont) - GFE CRITICALITY RATINGS 
ITEM NO. PART NUMBER NOMENCLATURE CAT FMEA 
AO131 SEB33100043-301 Intervalometer, Hassel III No 
Electric Camera 
A0132 SEB33100032-201 Lens, 250mm III No 
A0134 SEB33100266-301 Fuse, l6mm Camera III No 
(Spare) 
A0137 SEB32looo94-30l Clip, Flight Data File III No 
A0138 SEB32100025-301 Data Card Kit III No 
Ao146 SEB33100020-303 Cahle, Remote Control III No 
A0149 SEB33100306-301 Camera, Lunar III No 
Topographic 
AOl50 SEB33100310-301 Cable, Lunar III No 
Topographic 
A0151 SEB33100308-301 Control Box, Lunar III No 
Topographic 
A0152 SEB33100307-301 Magazine, Lunar III No 
Topographic 
A0153 SEB33ooo4o-304 Camera, Hasselblad III No 
Electric Data 
A0154 SEB33100261-301 Lens, 80mm III No 
A0155 SEB33100295-302 Camera/Power Pack Assy III No 
16mm L.S. 
BOlO0 SEB42100082-215 Kit, Medical Accessories III No 
BO101 SEB40100151-203 Kit, Survival Rucksack III Yes CSD-A-797 
No. 1 
B0102 SEB40100152-202 Kit, Survival Rucksack III. Yes CSD-A-797 
No. 2 
B0103 SEB42!O0086-203 Dispenser, Tissue III No 
Bolo4.1 sEB42100079 Assy, C/M Utility III No 
Towel 
B0105 SEB13100077-206 Bag, Helmet Stowage III Yes CSD-A-788 
In-flight 
BO06 SEB13100061-208 Garment, Constant Wear III Yes CSD-A-788 
24
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ITEM NO. PART IUMEER NOMENCLATURE CAT IMNEA 
B0107 A6L-400000-13 Garment, Liquid Cooled II Yes ILC-8-812­
4L-0002 
B0109 A6L-503000-10 Kit, EMU Maintenance III Yes ILc-8-812­
4L-0002 
B0110 14-0131-01 Water Dispenser/Fire 
Extinguisher Assy 
III Yes Whirlpool 
14-00836 
B0111 651-400-07 & -08 Mask and Hose, Oxygen II Yes CSD-A-658 
B0112.1 BW-1060-001 or Jacket Assy, ICG III Yes CSD-A788 
-002 
B0112.2 BW-1o6l-oo1 Trouser Assy, ICG III Yes CSDrA-788 
B0112.3 BW-1062-002 Boot, Fight, ICG III Yes CSD-A-788 
B0112.4 BW-1062-0O0 Boot, Left, ICG III Yes CSD-A-788 
B0113 A6L-501000-05 Subsystem, Fecal III Yes ILC-8-812-
Containment 4L-0002 
B0115 ACR-FA-5 Penlights III No 
Bo116 14-149-01 Clamp, UCTA III No 
B0117 14-0133-01 System, Urine Transfer ITT Yes Whirlpool 
14-00843 
Bo118 14-02051 Receiver Assy, UTS, III Yes Whirlpool 
(Spare) 14-00843 
B0120.1 SEB42100112-201 Stowage Bag Assy, Roll- III No 
and -202 and -203 on-Cuff 
B0121 ATL-502003-03 Shield, Helmet Pro- III Yes ILC-8-812­
tective 4L-0002 
B0130 BW-1052-001 Pad, Headrest III No 
B0132 BW-1053-001 and* Heel Restraint (Pr) III No 
-002 
B0134 SEB12100083-301 Adapter, UCTA Transfer III No 
B0135 A6L-507000-03 Adapter, CWG Electrical III Yes ILC-8-812­
kL-O002 
B0137 SEB12100084-301 Eyepatch III No 
B0138 ATL-IoIl8-ol Protective Cover, PGA III Yes ILC-8-812-
Electrical Connector 4L-0002 
TABLE A4 (cont) - GFE CRITICALITY RATITS 25 
ITEM NO. PART NUMBER NOMENCLATURE CAT FMA 
30139 BW-1079-002 Brush, Vacuum III No 
B0144 SEB14000010-303 Receptacle Assy, Urine III No 
BOl45 
B0147 
SEB39104914-303 
SEB13100134-301 
Gas Separator Cartridge 
H20 Disp. Adapter Assy. 
Bag, Jettison Stowage 
III 
II 
No 
No 
C0100 14-0122 Items, Food and Hygiene III Yes 14-00829 
C0101 14-0123 Package, Food III Yes 14-00829 
D0100 BPB-OP-4-2-001 Meter, Radiation Survey III No 
10101 SEB12100045-303 Dosimeter, Passive 
Radiation 
III No 
EO014 SLB16100920 Headset, Lightweight III No 
E0105 75101-126-04 Eartube, Universal III No 
E0110 SEB16101081-301 Apollo Color TV System III No 
A0200 SEB12100033-201 Sunglasses III No 
A0201 SEB12100034-203 Pouch, Sunglasses II No 
A0202 SEB12100039-001 
or -002 
Chronograph ITT No 
A0203 SEB12100030-202 Watchband III No 
A0204 SEB12100051-204 Pens, Data Recording III No 
A0205 SEB12100082-301 Pen, Marker III No 
A0206 SEB12100081-301 Pencil III No 
A0207 SEB33100047-302 Sliderule III No 
A0208 SEB12100085-301 Bag, Motion Sickness III No 
B0200 
B0200.1 
ATL-100000-TBD 
A7L-100002 
Pressure Garment 
Assembly - EV 
Torso Limb Suit Assy 
EV 
-
I 
I 
Yes 
Yes 
ILC-8-812­
4L-0002 
ILC-8-812­
4L-0002 
B0200.2 A7L-102043-03 Helmet Assy, Pressure I Yes iLC-8-812­
4L-0002 
26 TABLE A4f - GFE CRITICALITY RATINGS 
ITEM NO. PART NUMBER NOMENCLATURE CAT f2A 
B0200.3 A7L-103000-l8/19 Gloves, IV-Pair I Yes ILC-8-812­
4L-0002 
B0200.4 16536G-o4 Communication Carrier II Yes D. Clark 
B0200.5 A7L-201123-01 Pocket, Checklist and III Yes ILC-8-812-
Scissors 4L-0002 
B0200.6 A7L-201121-01 Pocket, Checklist III Yes ILC-8-812­
4L-0002 
B0201 A7L-100000-TBD Pressure Garment Assy - I Yes ILC-8-812-
IV 4L-0002 
B0201.1 AL-IOOOO4-TBD Torso Limb Suit Assy - I Yes ILC-8-812-
IV 4L-0002 
B0201.3 A7L-103000-18/-19 Gloves, fV-Pair I Yes ILC-8-812­
4L-0002 
B0201.4 165360-o4 Carrier, Communication II Yes DCM-A3C-05 
B0201.5 A7L-2010h9-03 Pocket, Checklist and III Yes ILC-8-812-
Scissors 4L-0002 
B02o0.6 ATL-201047-03 Pocket, Checklist ITT Yes ILC-8-812­
4L-0002 
B0202 SEB40100165-203 Vest, Dual Life III Yes CSD-A-798 
B0203 SEB42100083-306 Assy, Bioinstrumentation III Yes Space labs 
501-005 
B0204 SDB42100059-202 Scissors III No 
B0205 14-010S-02 
%14-oo81o 
UCTA III Yes WhirlpQol 
B0206 ACR-FA-5 Penlights III No 
B0207 SEB13loo084-202 Assy, Bio Belt III Yes CSD-A-788 
B0208 SEBl31oo6i-208 Garment, Constant Wear III Yes CSD-A-788 
B0210 SEB42!00104-004/ Earplugs III No 
-005 
D0200 SEB16100703-201 Dosimeter, Personal III No 
D0201 SEB12100045-201 Dosimeter, Passive III No 
E0200.1 SEB42100o4-002/ Eerpiece, Molded II No 
-003 (Comm Carrier) 
TABLE A (ceont) - GFE CRITICALITY RATINGS 
ITEM NO. PART NUMBER NOMENCLATURE CAT FMEA 
E0200.2 7101-TBD Eartube, (Comm Carrier) III No 
I0400 SEB39143o4-301 Experiment Assy, S-158 III No 
ITEM NO. 
A1000 
TABLE A4 
PART NUMBER 
SEB33100100-209 
- GFE CRITICALITY .RATINGS-
NOMENCLATURE CAT 
Camera, l 6mm Data III 
Acquisition 
FMA 
No 
28 
A1005 SEB33100113-303 Filter, Polarizing III No 
A1007 
Aloo8 
SEBl2lOoo18-202 
SXB32100077 
Kit, Pilots Preference 
(PPK) 
File Assembly, Flight 
Data 
III 
III 
No 
No 
AlOll SEB33100010- 302 Lens, lOmm III No 
A1013 SEB33100015-302 Strap, Interim Stowage III No 
A1015 SEB33100040-304 Camera, Lunar Surface 
Electric Has selblad 
III No 
A1016 SEB33100048-303 Lens, 60mm III No 
A1020 SEB331oo266-301 Fuse, 16mm Camera (Spare) III No 
A1021 SEB33100277-303 Adapter, Brkt, RT Angle, 
l6mm Camera 
III No 
A1022 SEB33100020-303 Cable, Remote Control, 
16mm Camera 
III No 
A1023 SEB33100046-301 Protective Cover, Reseau III No 
A1024 SEB32100025-301 Kit, Data Card III No 
A1025 SEB32100099-301 Clamp, Book III No 
A1026 SEB32100094-301 Clip, Data File III No 
A1027 SE333100294-302 Trigger, Electric 
Hasselblad Camera 
III No 
Alo28 SEB33100293-302A Handle, Electric 
Hasselblad Camera 
III No 
A1029 SEB33100291- 301 Tether, EVA Retractable III No 
A1031 SEB12100050-202 Tape, Roll III No 
A1032 v36- 60llo1-4 Bungee Cord III No 
A1036 SEB32100094-3o2 Clip, Data File III No 
A1039 SE33100397-301 Pliers, Needle Nose III No 
TADLE Ah (cont) - GFE CRITICALITY RATINGS 29
 
ITEM NO. PART NUMBER 
A1040 SEB33100302-302 
Al041 SEB33100564-3ol 
BLOC1 SV721783-9 
BlOOl.1 SV742170-2 
B1002 SV710854-9 
B1003 SV718783-9 
B1004 SV701900-19 
or -20* 
B1007 SEB40lOO185- 303 
B1008 SEB42100080-202 
B1009 14-0ill-01 
B1010 14-0131-01 
B1012 SV73o1l-2-16 
B1013 A6L-502000-O9 
Bf014 A7L-205000-05 
B1015 A7L-203025-09/-10 
BlO16 A6L-503000-10 
fl1017 A6L-505000-03 
BlO18 ATL-106043-05/06 
B102Q SJB33100199-314 
B1020.1 SEB33100198-3010R* 
B1020.2 SEB33100191-313 
B1020. 3 SDB33100214-304 
NOMENCIAT3E 
Checklist, EVA Cuff 

Bracket, Wedge, 

16mm Camera
 
Remote Control Unit -

Bracket, Camera Mount 

Cartridge, PISS LiOH 

Cartridge/Canister, 

PISS LiOH 
Battery, PLSS 

* or -21 or -22 
Medical Package, IM 

Utility Towel Assy, IM 

Defecation Collection 

Device 

Water Dispenser/Fire 

Extinguishing Assembly 
Oxygen Purge System (0Ps) 
Bag, Helmet Stowage 
Lunar Extravehicular 
Visor Assembly-LEVA 
Gloves, EV 
Kit, EMU Maintenance 
Purge Valve Assembly 
Boots, Lunar-PR 

Kit, LEC-Waist Tether 
Bag Assembly, LEC + Wt 
*-303 
Conveyer Assembly, Lunar 

Equipment 
Bag, Deploy. LunarEquipment Conveyer
 
CAT FMA 
III No 
III No 
II HSD-SVHSER 5441 
III HSD-SVHSER 5541 
II HSD-SVHSER 5441 
II 
II SVSHER 5541 
III No 
III No 
III Whirlpool ­
14-00838 
III Whirlpool ­
14-00836 
I RSD-SVSHER 5441 
III ILC-8-812-4L-0002 
II ILc-8-812-4iL-0002 
TI ILC-8-812-4L-0002 
III ILC-8-812-4L-0002 
TI ILC-8-812-4L-O002 
II ILC-8-812-4L-0002 
III CSD-A-598 & -6o 
(see items below) 
ITT No 
III CSD-A-598 & -6o 
III No 
TABLE A4 (cont) - GVE CRITICALITY RATINGS 30
 
ITEM NO. PART NUMBER NOMENCLATURE CAT FMEA 
'B1020.4 SEB33100191-312 Life Line, (Light Weight) III CSD-A-598 & -600 
B1020.5 SDB33100214-301 OR* Bag, Deploy. Life Line 
* -305 
III No 
B1020.6 SEB33100192-301 Tether, Waist EVA III CSD-A-598 & -60D 
B1020.7 SEB33100192-302 Tether, Waist EVA III CSD-A-598 & -600 
B1021 SV723426-1 Straps, Attach. OFS/PGA III SVYRER 5441 
B1022 SV723409-1 Straps, Attach. OPS/PGA 'III SVHSER 5441 
B1023 SEB12100084-301 Eyepatch III No 
B1024 SEBIl00066-349 PlS/EVeS Assembly I (see below) 
BI024.1 SV706100 6-33 PISS I SVHSER 5441 
BLO24.2 8358750-503 EVCS-1 , I Informal (no Doc; No.) 
B1025 SEBll100066-350 PIS/EVCS Assembly .I (see below) 
B1025.1 SV706100-6-33 PISS I SVSER 5441 
B1025.2 8358751-503 rVCS-2 II Informal (no Doe. No.) 
B1027 SEB13100134-301 Bag, Jettison Stowage III No 
BI041 SEB33100290- 302 Safety Line, Lunar 
Surface (100 Ft) 
III CSD-A-600 
,BI043 14-0112-01 Towels, IM Utility (Red) III No 
B1044 14-0112-03 Towels, IM Utility (Blue) III No 
B1045 SEB39105185-301 Brush, Lunar Dust III No 
B1047 SDB3310021i4- 306 Bag, Lunar Surface 
Safety Line 
III No 
Bio48 14-0145-01 Device, In-Suit, Drinking III , No 
B1052 sVy29602 Umbilical, Emergency 
Supply (Buddy System) 
II SVHSER 5441 
B1053 SV729603 Bag, Stowage, Umbilical 
(Buddy System) 
III SVHSER 5441 
C1000 14-0121 IM Food Assembly 
(2-2/3 Man Days) 
II 14-00829 
31 TABLE A -(cont - GFE CRITICALITY RATINGS 
ITEM NO. PART NUMBER NOMENCIATURE CAT FMA 
El001 TBD TV System, TM Color III No 
N1001 SEB39105177- 301 Flag Kit, Lunar Surface III •No 
1002 TBD Flag Kit, Symbolic III No 
G4000.1 2338660 Rev. R Mounting Assembly RTG 
Fuel Cask 
III ATM-855 
4oo.2 k7E30113-G2 Rev. N Fuel Cask III ATM-852 
G4000.3 47D300400 Rev. u OR* Fuel Capsule Assembly 
* Rev. R 
III ATM-852 
G4001 2334845-Rev. U Pallet Assembly No. 1 III ATM-501 
G4001.1 2330750-6 Active Seismic Experiment III ATM-501 
G4001.2 2338460-2 Passive Seismic 
Experiment 
III AM-501 
G4001.4 2330662 Charged Particle Lunar 
Environment Experiment 
III ATM-501 
G4002 2334849-3 Rev. AC Pallet Assembly No. 2 III AUE-501 
G4002.1 
G4002.2 
47E300779 
2330660 
Radioisotope Thermo- III 
Electric, General Assembly 
Super-Thermal ION Detect III 
ATM-852 
AW4-501 
/Cold Cathode Gage Exp 
G4002.3 2335945 PSE Leveling Stool III ATl-501 
G4002.4 SGB39101165-205 Lunar Geological Exp 
Tool Carrier with Tools 
III ATM-501 
G4002.5 ALSEP Deployment Tools III ATM-501 
G4003 EM64416/2-02 Sample Return Container 
No. 1 
III No 
G4o4 EM64416/2-02 Sample Return Container 
No. 2 
III No 
G4oo6 SEB39100319-204 Hammer III No 
o4007 
oiioo8 
SEB39103122-303 
TBD 
Scoop, Lunar Sample 
(Large) 
Extension H-andle 
III 
III 
No 
No 
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ITEM NO. PART NUMBER NOMENClATURE, CAT FMEA 
G4oo9 SEB3910034o-203 Tongs III No 
G4011 SEB39103769-302A Solar Wind Composition III, No 
Experiment 
G40l2 SEB39100317-202 Gnomon III No 
G4o16 M11329-EK-0-O--05 Container, Contingency
Lunar Sample Return Soft 
III No 
G4018 M10543RM001-04 Weigh Bag III No 
G40_l%not 442-0003-20 Camera Assembly, LGEC III Yes Document No. assigned 
G4022 442-o004-20 Container Assembly, III -No 
Return Cassette-Empty 
G4024 442-0002-26 Magazine Assembly, LEC III Yes Document No. 
not assigned 
G4025 442-ooll-20 Cassette, Take-up, Lunar III Yes Document No. 
Geol. Exp. Camera not assigned 
G4029 TBD Tool, Trenbbhing III No 
G4o30 442-0006-20 Cover Assembly, Spare III No 
Magazine, LGEC 
G4031 SEB39105200-301 Scale, Sample III No 
G4033 TBD Magnetometer, Lunar III Doe. No. TBD 
Portable 
G4034 TBD Reflector, Laser Ranging III EJAM-25 
Retro 
G4036 TBD Bracket, RCU/LGEC EVA III No 
J4000 2501-122-M Camera, Closeup Stereo III No 
J4001 2501-120 Cassette, CSC III No 
Instl. GFE RFB-oP-4-2-002 RSM Bracket II No 
Instl. GFE sEB16100661-201 Van Allen Belt III No 
Bosimeter 
Instl. GFE SV713883 Gas Conn. Mount Plate III SVHSER 5441 
Instl. GFE SV714121-4 Oxygen Recharge Conn. II SVESER 5441 
Instl. GFE SV710911-4 Water Recharge Conn. (IM) II SVHSER 5441 
TABLE A (cont) - GFE CRITICALITY RATINS 33 
IM NO. PART NTMER NOMNCIATURE CAT FMEA 
Instl. GFE SV710908-5 Vehicle Water Conn. (uM) II SVHSER 5441 
Instl. GFE SV710911-4 Water Recharge Conn. (CM) 2I SVHSER 5441 
Instl. GFE SV7lO9o8-5 Vehicle Water Conn. (CM) II SVHSER 5441 
Iistl. GFE 14-0119 Urine Flow Indicator III 14-00825 
6.3 	 Life Support Systems Detailed
 
Investigation
 
6.3.1 	 EMU Single Point Failure Review
 
6.3.2 	 Pre- and Post-flight Suit Leakage
 
Summa ry 
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TABLE A5 
EMO SINGLE POINT FAILURE STUDY 
PL9S and OPS 
Oxygen Ventilation Circuit
 
Primary Oxygen Bottle
 
OPS Bottle
 
OPS Regulator Bellows
 
OPS Hose
 
PGA 
Pressure Bladder
 
Closures
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EMU 	 SYSTEMS FAILURE MODE AND EFFECT ANALYSIS (MmA'S) 
EMIU CONTRACTOR'S FMA'S MAINTAINED CONTINUOUSLY 
PESS/OPS -Hamilton Standard Document No. SVHSER 5441 
FIA/LCG - ILC Industries Document No. 8812 4Lo003 
4/PLSS/OPS/PGA - GAC Document No. NB/SY-2-69-30 
HARDWARE CRITICALITY CLASSIFICATION 
I. 	 Necessary to sustain crewman's life.
 
II. 	 Necessary to perform the mission.
 
III. Other.
 
SINGLE POINT FAILURE CRITICALITY CLASSIFICATION
 
I. 	 Failure would cause loss of crewman.
 
II. 	 Failure would cause loss of mission or second
 
failure would cause loss of crewman.
 
III. 	Other.
 
EMU CRITICALITY I SINGLE POINT FAILURES 
FGA 	 SINGLE POINT FAILURES 
1. 	 Burst or ruptured bladder. 
2. 	Excessive pressure sealing closure leakage.
 
PLSS SINGLE POINT FAILURES 
1. 	PiSS 02 umbilical rupturing (or any rupture in the low pressure 
loop) - failure effect - rapid loss of suit pressure. 
2. 	LiOH cartridge fails to sufficiently absorb C02 - failure effect ­
increase in C02 partial pressure. (NOTE: Criticality changed to
 
II because a C02 sensor is available for Apollo 14 and subsequent).
 
3. 	PISS high pressure 0 system bursts - failure effect - shrapnel,
 
resulting in penetraion of PGA.
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OPS 	SINGLE POINT FAILURES
 
1. 	OFS high pressure system bursts - failure effect - shrapnel
 
resulting in penetration of the PGA.
 
2. 	OrS 02 umbilical rupturing (or any rupture in the low pressure
 
gas loop) - failure effect - rapid loss of suit pressure.
 
If the OPS is ever used as the primary life support system, the following
 
single point failure must also be considered:
 
OPS pressure regulator fails open - failure effect - bursts lGA.
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ITEM: PLSS 02 Ventilation Circuit (see page 39
 
FAILURE: Gross Leakage ( 8#/hour:equivalent to 4 inch hole in suit bladder)
 
HISTORY: None
 
EFFECT: Early Depletion of Prime and Backup 02 Supply
 
POSSIBLE CAUSES: 	 Physical Damage from External Source-or Structural
 
Defect
 
WHY SPF PRESENT: 	 Elimination would require redundant ventilation circuit
 
and PGA interfaces plus complex crossover valving yield­
ing excess weight and volume with increase in potential
 
failure points.
 
ACCEPTANCE RATIONALE:
 
Design: Umbilicals have inner pressure wall plus fabric wrap and
 
wire reinforcing. All component connections are bonded and clamped.
 
Seal usage reviewed for requirements. Only components exposed to external
 
damage are EGA umbilicals which are covered with beta cloth enclosed thermal
 
sheath which provides abrasion protection. Internal plumbing is metallic.
 
Umbilical axial load requirements set at 60 pounds minimum.
 
Qualification Test: Umbilical and bond strength and system pressure
 
cycle endurance verified to exceed use requirements.
 
Flight Hardware Inspections: Component proof and leakage testing;
 
system FDA umbilical pull test; system PDA proof and leakage; ground use
 
and leakage testing; pre-flight PIA leakage testing.
 
RECOMMENDATION: No Change Required.­
OXYGEN VENTILATING CIRCUIT SCHEMATIC 
OXYGEN 
OXYGEN CONNECTOR PRIMARY OXYGEN VENTILATION FLOW
 
\SENSOR
SUPPLY SYSTEM STEAM FAN 
TO VACUUM 
f/ CHECK VALVE ILTSEPARATOR [bZ{1ZBE E EDWAWATECUTLE 
UEEDWATER DRAIN WATER 
CONTAMINANT FRO M T EERVOIR 
CONTROL RESERVOIR 
ASSEMBLY 
SUB LIMATOR 
TEMP 
TRANSDUCER
 
OXEWATERF T 
 lPOROUS
SOXYGEN 
FEEDWATER IT 
OXYGEN 
OU
 
FIGURE A2 
4o 
, -S. Oxygen 'ottle (see description, pages 42 -. 42). 
RunL --ire (Exmloaes) 
STRYZ: None 
UffiCT: Possible injury to crew and/or damage to equipment. 
FOSS TBYE g4^JC5, T-hysical damage from external source or struel 
defect
 
. 1 No other means presently feasible for required 
.application. 
2. Incornor'ation-of scatter shield would requii-e 
excessive veight and volume.
 
Ddsign: 	 Reference Page 4-a for physical data on FOS bottle. 
Reference :Page 44 for protection of PLSS 02 bottle from 
external damage. 
Qualificstion Tests:
 
Component level - Table A7 summarizes the results of cvclic 
and environmental testing conducted on a 
total-of 1 bottles. 
Systems level - PLSS qualification has demonstrated the 
capability of the 02 bottle to satisfy the
 
total spectrmn of mission qualification
 
requirements.
 
Flight Hardware Inspections:
 
Corponent Acceptance Test - Proof pressure and leakage tests 
plus radiographic and penetrant 
inspections. 
System PDA - proof pressque and-external leakage tests p)lus 
visual examinations. 
Ground Test Cycles - -MSCPIA (including leakage tests at maximum 
operating pressure plus visual inspections), 
unmanned 	 and manned performance evluation. 
-Preflight PTA - External leakage at maximum operating pressure and 
final visual inspection. 
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RECOMMENATION: No change in bottle design or plumbing.
 
NOTE: -7 PISS Bottle changed to approximately 14oo psi operating
 
pressure. Requalification test program will assure reliability retention.
 
PLSS 0 2 BOTTLE PROTECTION 
(TOP VIEW) 
PLSS SHELL
 
(3SIDES) 
PSS 02, BOTTLE SHIELDSHIELD 
WALL OR FLOOR (PLSS STOWED) -,_ 
(S DONNED) 
FIGURE A3 
TABLE A6 
PISS PRIMARY OXYGEN SUPPLY BOTTLE DATA 
ITEM P/N 
QTY/ 
SIC DIMENSIONS MATERIAL 
(psia) 
DES. PRESSURES 
Limit Proof Burst 
(psia) 
NORMAL 
OPER. 
PRESS. 
SAFETY 
FACTOR 
Act. Theor. 
(psia) 
QUAL. 
BURST 
PRESS. MFR. 
POS Bottle 8V713010 2 Cycle die. 
6.082!' OD 
Height 
16.03lmax. 
Wall Thickness 
0.028" min. 
AISI 301 
unaged 
1110 1665 2220 1020 
+ 10 
2.1 2.0 2345 
to 
245o 
(lO 
bottles 
Thrst) 
ARDE, 
Inc. 
Volume 
378 cu. in. 
Theoretical Safety rector - Design burst pressure/maximum pressure; 
maximum oper, pressure. 
Actual Safety Factor - Lowest actual burst/ 
Lii 
TABLE A7 - EMU PRIMARY OXYGEN BOTTLE QUALIFICATION TEST RESULTS 
Test Plan No. SS-4023A 
Test Vessel 
S/N 
Environmental 
and/or Mission 
Simulation Tests 
Total Operating Cycles 
@ 1130+20 psig 
1000 Cycles Minimum 
Total Proof Cycles 
@ 1685L20 psig 
10 Cycles Minimum 
Static Burst 
Pressure 
2220 psig 
Burst Hoop 
Stress psi 
Required Prior to Required Prior to Min. Req. 
Rupture Rupture 
Proof & 
Operating 
Pressure 
31 
42 
43 
1002 
1002 
1002 
12 
12 
12 
2370 
2350 
2370 
255,012 
254,505 
255,012 
Cycles 
Operating 18 8726* 12 ...... 
Pressure 23 8281* 12 ...... 
Cycles to 
Failure 
Proof 26 1 2811* 
Pressure 27 2 1219* ...... 
Cycles to 
Failure 
A&c 
. 
Vibr. 
& impact 
35 
44 
20g's for 100 sec. 
Two 78 g.saw tooth 
pulses 10-15ms rise 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2350 
2390 
255,500
258,750 
time & O-lms delay 
time - all 3 along 3 
orth axes. 
Humidity 29 100 rel. humidity for 2 3 2345 259,826 
10 temp. cycles 840 to 
160PF 24 hrs/cycle 
1 hr. @ OF. 
Salt Spray 30 l%oNaCl by weight 3 2 235C 257,325 
95 r 48 hrs. 
Burst 13 
4 
41 
1 
1 
1 
3 
1 
1 
2400 
2450 
2380 
253,300 
257,280 
258,000 
*Cycles to failure
 
ITEM: OPS Bottle (see description psges.46 & 47).
 
FAILURE MODE: Rupture (Explodes)
 
HISTORY: None
 
EFFECT: 	 Possible injury to crew and/or-damage to equipment.
 
POSSIBLE 	CAUSES: Physical damage from external source or
 
structural defect.
 
WHY SP PRESENT: (i) No other means presently feasible for required
 
application.
 
(2) 	Incorporation of scatter shiel&would require 
excessive weight and volume. 
ACCEPTANCE RATIONALE:
 
Design: 	 Reference Page 46 for physical data on 0PS bottle.
 
Reference Page 47 for protection of 0PS 02 bottles from
 
external damage.
 
Qualification Tests:
 
Component Level - The 0PS bottle qual. test report is SVHSER 5249. The
 
results of this testing, including actual bottle burst
 
valves, are shown on pages 48 & 49.
 
System Qualification - The CPS underwent systems level qualification
 
including,
 
* Vibration and shock
 
* Pressure cycling 
* Thermal soak 
* System operational life cycles
 
The 0PS successfully completed this program.
 
Flight Hardware Inspections:
 
Component Level - Proof pressure and leakage tests plus radiographic
 
and penetrant inspections.
 
System PDA - Proof pressure and leakage testing
 
Ground Test Cycle - MSC PIA (includes lebkage tests at maximum operating
 
pressure), unmanned, and manned performance evaluations. 
Pre-flight PIA - leakage at maximum operating pressure and visual examination. 
Recomendation: No change required. 
TABLE A8
 
OPS OXYGEN BOTTLE DATA 
ITEM P/N 
QTY/ 
S/C DIMENSIONS MATERIAL 
(psia) 
DES. PRESSURES 
Limit Proof Burst 
(psia) 
NORMAL 
OPER. 
PRESS. 
SAFETY 
FACTOR 
Act. Theor. 
(psia) 
QUAL. 
BURST 
PRESS. MFR. 
OPS Bottle SV730103 4 Spherical 
7.04 + .030D 
Wall Thickness 
=0.130 min. 
AIMS 5664 
(Inconel
718) 
-(5 
67o0 10130 13500 5880 
+ 80 
2.2 2.0 14,700 
to 
15,200
bott 
burst) U 
4C C) 
C H
P 
-TheoreticalSafety-Factor 
-Design Burst Pressure/Maximum Operating Pressure 
Actual Safety Fact - Lowest Actual Burst/Maximum Operating Pressure N 
PROTECTION OF OPS 02 BOTTLES 
OPS (TOP VIEW) 
OPSBOTTLE OPS BOTTLE 
SHELL
 
(4SIDES AND TOP)
 
FIGURE A4 
.'-.qj SVHSER 5249 
Page h8 SUMA.RY 
S/N 16 
""he Oxygen Purge System (OPS) Oxygen Bottle S/N 16 was tested in accordance with 
paragraph 4.1 of Qualification Test Procedure SSP 3052. The test sequence was 
Production Aeceptalce Test (PAT), Burst Pressure Test, a-d Metallurgical Examina­
tion. All of the bottle qua] production acceptance tests consisted of an examination of 
product, proof and dye penetrant test, aad external leakage test, The burst j-ressure 
for S/N 16 vessel was 152200 psig. The fracture origin occurred at the bottle weld 
bead. 
S/N, 11 
The Oxygen Ptu ge System (OPS) Oxygen Bottle -S/N 11 was tested in accordance with 
paragraph 4.2 of SSP3032. The test sequence was PAT, Operating Pressure CLcling 
to Failure and Nietallurgical Examination. The resulting cycle life of this vessel was 
59,364 cycles. The fracture origin occurred at the boss end of the vessel tube joint. 
S/M 17 
The Oxygen Purge System (OPS) Oxygen Bottle S/N 17 was tested in accordafnce with 
paragraph 4.5 of SSP 3052. The test sequence was PAT, Proof Pressure Cycling to 
Failure. and Metallurgical Examination. The resulting cycle life of this vessel was 
7,736 cycles. The fracture origin occurred at the boss end of the vessel tube joint. 
s/N 21 
The Oxygen Purge System (OPS) Oxygen Bottle S/N 21 was tested in accordance wtih 
paragraph 4.5 of SSP3052. The test sequence was PAT, Proof Pressure Cycling to 
Failure, and Metallurgical Examination. 'The resulting cycle life for this vessel was 
4,485 cycles, The fracture origin occurred at the weld edge of the bottle. 
S/N 24 
The Oxygen Purge System (OPS) Oxygen Bottle S/N 24 was tested in accordane with 
paragraph 4.3 of SSPS052. This vessel underwent environmental tests. The test se­
quence was PAT, Salt Fog, HLTuditv, PAT, Burst Pressure Test, and Metallurgical 
Examination. The Burst pressure for this vessel was 15,200 psig. The fracture origin 
occurred at the centerline of the weld zone. 
S/N 13 
The Oxygen Purge System (OPS) Oxygen Bottle S/N 13 was tested in 'accordance with 
paragraph 4.4 of SSP 3052. This vessel underwent structural tests. The test sequence 
1
 
5219 ,25,fl-0. .SViISER 
Page lt 
wAv:s PAT, Clealiness Check. Vira.ion1 Acceleration Shock, Cleanliness Chcak. 
PAT, Bur.st Pressure Test, and :c'.taiurgicai Exanination. The resulting burst pres­
sure for this vessel was 14, 00 psig. The fracture initiated at or near the outer su­
face of the weld. 
S/N 15 
The Oxygen PLrge System (OPS) Oxygen Bottle S/N 15 was tested in accordance with 
paragrauph 4.4 of SSP3052. Th.is vessel underwent structural tests. The test sequence 
was PAT. Cleanliness Check. Vibration, Accleration, Shock, Cleanliness Chock, 
PAT, Burst Pressure Test, and Metallurgical Examination. The resulting burst 
pressure for this vessel was 14,700 psig. The fracture origin occurred 0.25 inches 
above the weld. 
2
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ITEM: OPS Regulator (Primary Bellows) 
FAILURE: Massive Bellows Rupture
 
HISTORY: None 
EFFECT: 	 Early depletion of PLSS 0 supply - subsequent OPS actuation would 
result in PGA overpressur2zation and/or loss of 0PS oxygen supply. 
POSSIBLE 	CAUSES: Weak or Defective Bellows
 
NHY SFF PEESENT: (1) Failure potential so remote that added complexity
 
required for elimination is not warranted. Numerous 
Criticality II SPF's would result from added 
complexity. This is failure of nonstressed non­
operating component. (Reference page 51).
 
(2) 	Regulator located downstream of OPS shutoff valve
 
to preclude regulator being under 6000 psi during
 
normal operations.
 
ACCEPTANCE RATIONALE:
 
Design: 	 Material - electrically deposited nickel
 
Proof Pressure - 30 psid
 
Burst Pressure - 45 psid
 
Actual Operating Pressure - 3.4-4.0 paid
 
Qualification Tests: System qualification of the OPS verified the
 
endurance capability and structural integrity of the regulator bellows
 
for the required environments and application.
 
Flight Hardware Inspection: The bellows are subjected to the following
 
tests which would detect weak or defective units-

Component - leakage and spring rate
 
Subassembly (Regulator) - steady rate regulation at high and low 
temperatures plus internal and external
 
regulator leakage
 
OPS PDA - vibration plus same as subassembly 
Ground Use Cycle - MSC PTA, manned testing and performance checks 
(regulation and leakage) 
Preflight PIA - regulator set-point check plus internal and external 
leakage 
Pre-egress Checkout - regulator performance check 
RECOMMENDATION: No change required.
 
OPS FLOW SCHEMATIC
 
BOTTLE BOTT LE 
(SPACE) AMBIENT VACUUM _FL PRESSURE 
FILL GARMENT 
BELLOWS GUEASML 
0 0o SHUT-OFF 
0TO PG3A VALVE 
VIEW A-A IREGULATOR 
FIGURE A5
 
TEm: OPS Umbiical 
FATjr. Tloss RLpture - Lsg i r 
ISTORY: 'None 
EFFECT: Loss of PGA Pressure Control 
POSSIBIE CAUSES: Physical Damage from External Sourde or Structural Defect
 
WHY SPF PRESETi: Elimi nation -ould -require redundant umbilical and PGA 
interface plus crossover valving yielding excess weight
 
and volure with increased number of potehtial failure 
points.
 
aCCEPTAWCE RATIOYALE: 
Design: Umbilical designed with inner pressure sealing liner protected
 
by fabric wi-ap and wire reinforcing in outer layers. Umbilical also covered 
by beta fabric enclosed thermal sheath which provides added abrasion protection. 
Umbilical axial load requirement set at 60 pounds minimum. 
Qualiflication Test: Umbilical and bond strenth and system pressure
 
cycle endurance 1,erified to exceed.use requirements.
 
Flight Hardware Insrections: Component proof and leakage besting; 
system FDA umbilical pull test; system IDA proof and leakage' tests; ground 
use an6 leakage tests; preflight PIA leakage testing. 
BECOlcti'RDATI~iO 'No Change Required. 
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ITEM: PGA
 
FAILURE: a. Catastrophic leakage of pressure retention layer (see 
description on pages 54 & 55 ). 
b. Catastrophic failure of PGA pressure retention layer 
penetration (i.e., zipper, wrist disconnects, connectors, 
etc.) (see description on pages 56- & 7 ). 
HISTORY: Pressurized Apollo PGA testing has been conducted since 1965.
 
In that time approximately.2800 hours of pressurized PGA time
 
in controlled suits. During this period, 59 leakage rates above 
specification limits (18Oecc per minute) have been recorded. 
None of the failures would have been catastrophic. Twelve 
failures had leakage which would be considered significant 
(> 2000 scc/min.). One of these failures produced leakage in 
excess of make up capability. This failure is attributed to 
human error (see Failure Analysis Report, NL-01149-O1 on page 
59). A plot of the results of 579 test points is shown 
on the chart on page 58. 
EFFECT: Loss.of crewman protection.
 
POSSIBLE CAUSES: Physical damage or structural defect. 
WHY SPF PRESENT: a. Connectors and other penetrations except for zipper
 
appear to have extremely high reliability with
 
safety lock/locks with no additional modifications
 
required.
 
b. Redundant pressure layer could be developed to
 
improve reliability. This concept was investigated 
early in the Apollo suit development program and was 
found undesirable. Prototype evaluation indicated
 
tkat the double wall adversely affected mobility,
 
bulk, and crewman comfort. 
ACCEPTANCE RATIONALE: 
Design: See descriptions for failure modes A and B (pages5 4 &56 '. 
Qualification Test: PGA bladder assembly, connector seal integrity,
 
system pressure cycle endurance and total system pressure capability
 
verified to exceed use requirements.
 
Flight Hardware Inspections: Component proof and leakage testing;
 
system PDA proof and leakage tests; ground use and leakage tests; pre­
flight PIA leakage testing.
 
RECOMMENDATION: No change required.
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PGk Single Point Failures
 
A. Catastrophic leakage of the pressure retention layer (see next page) 
1. TLSA; (a) Single layer pressure bladd.er of neoprene coated nylon
 
(b) Single layer convolutes of nylon reinforced neoprene
 
(c) Single layer pressure retention boot of neoprene
 
2. Helmet; Single layer of .050 inches minimum of polycarbonate 
3. Gloves. Single layer of nylon reinforced neoprene 
There are no redundant pressure retention layers in the PGA. 
The original design reflected the awareness of the single point 
failure, In addition the following OCBD's have been processed to reduce 
probability of failure.
 
6E132
 
6E142 Add reinforcement patches 
7E114 
6E160 Add protective layer to P0A 
7E133 Add abrasion cover to IV gloves 
7E13_41 Redesign PGA helmet neck r-ing compression band 
7E135 Redesign helmet vent pad edges 
7E175 Add scuff patches to torso limb suit assembly 
7E335 Modify neck band 
8E172 Change adhesive on shoulder ring 
8E300 Add fluorel coating to IV gloves 
05052 Add redesigned scuff patches and knee patches 
8E036 Add reinforcement scuff material 
8E048 Relocate compression band channel slit. 
8Elll Redesign cable ending 
8E333 Heat treat compression band bracket 
9E215 Add scuff layer protection 
9E386 Incorporate redesigned boot bladder
 
55 SPACE SUIT (PGA) 
ARM ASSEMBLY 
HELMET
= - • 

LEG ASSEMBLY 
SUIT ASSEMBLYGOVESORSIMB 

FIGURE A6 
B. 	 Gat,.stronpc failure of e PG- pressure retention layer penetration 
(i.e. zipper, wrist disconnects, connectors etc.) 
1. Pressure sealing closure; metal teeth intermeshed and seal of 
neoprene. 
2. Gas connectors;(a) metal sandwiched bladder layer with penetrations 
through bladder for screws. (b) Metal to "O"1ring seal through connector. 
(c) Connections are self-sealing.
 
3. 	 Neck and rist disconnects; metal to 1101 ring seal through disconnects 
Connectors are bonded and/or clamped to bladder for TISA attachment. 
4. 	 Miasc. penetrations same as 2 above, 
T
There are no redundant I'o rings or pressure retention layers in tI PGA. 
Add+ioral changes processed to reduce the probability of failures. 
6E003 Mod.gas connector to stop leak
 
6B'097 Cnngef!Ohlring from single to double bar 
6Ell8 Add lock lock to glove and helmet closure 
6E179 
6El.2 Modify slide fastener
 
7E076 Add safety locks to gas connectors
 
7F137 Change feedport material to aluminum 
71l38 Redesign helmet neck ring 
7E216 
7E208 Add molded lip seal in wrist disconnect 
8E035
 
8E034 Redesign wrist disconnect' 
8E108
 
8E109 Change pressure sealing zipper lock lock
 
8E332 Add thick contoured feed port gaskets
 
8E346
 
8E335 Improve operations of slide fastener
 
0E025 Change to zipper look look
 
8E029 Add lock assembly to neck ring
 
8M268 Redesign helmet slide and suit side neck rings
 
8E362 Change lock tab
 
8E439 Redesign feedport door
 
9E137 Feed port configuration change
 
--------
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SPACE SUIT (PGA) -FEED THROUGHS
 
HELMET ATTACHING RING 
SUIT ELECTRICAL 
CONhECTOR (INNER IN 
OUTER ELECTRICAL FLANGES) 
GAS CONNECTOR, - MULTIPLE WATER RECEPTACLE INLET (2 EACH) 
- TORSO
 
ARM ASSEMBLY -PRESSURE RELIEF VALVE 
GAS CONNECTOR, 
OUTLET (2 EACH) 
WRIST DISCONNECT 
PRESSURE GAGE 
BIC MEDICAL 
INJECTION PATCH SLIDE FASTENER 
URINE TRANSFER CONNECTOR 
LEG FIGUEA 
FIGURE A7 
Rc 
FIGURE A 8 
PGA LEAKAGE RATE HISTORY 
579 TEST POINTS FROM PDA, REC. INSPECTION, PIA,
AND POST TEST INSPECTIONS ON 28 PGA's (WORST CASES 
OF 115 CONTROLLED TYPE FLI GHT SU ITS) 
20 -
NUMBER OF 
TEST POINTS / 
i0o -
0-50 s1--0 101-150) 151 
1-2 POINTS ABOVE 
2000 SCCIMIN 
200 Z01-250 251-300 301- 350 351"400 401-450451-5501-550 551-601 
PGA LEAKAGE (SCM IN) 
59 
1-23-67
 
-NOT REPRODUCIBLE 
A. c 	 .... O,,n ".4 " Larry Young (iC Field Reprsentate. rc­
veadlthc on .. 13-6Y rhc shoulder cable coating split an USli 
tack cj itself exposing approximately 3 inches of cable. r. Young 
•.a e Lhit there woas nor any broken strands of cable visible ac 
Vie " ILO NASA a;ware ther ,, wLn, c ci bt" - and and maae them of 
"- a -a-i 5 c was advisable to cut te "'hanging" piece of 
¢CaL'.:Ftoai::g . _-'iss ion to cut the "hanging ; piece of caole coat­
-t' , J.. 7"-.i ..... Xoirert Davd son for IMC Znd fromi. 
-:r...o,1e t SC. for .ASA.. T'ne hangi.ng piece of cable coa-in was 
tCnI at c, bt' :.. L:rry Youang with a pair or scissors. This left 
a ri]zc a-ound ,hc re. ainin cable coating. 
2eztlng was resurmleo and it was roted ir.aediately that the rig 
crt..ni ny.: of the remaining cable coating was abraiding the 
..¢.lmn Ptch on Ltanrear of the left shoulder convoiute. 'i , 
br,aion conti-,3.ld unt-l a hole was worn through the Hliri a" Patch 
and finaily throuh the left shoulder convoluLe resulting in 42.0 
G0T likage on 1-28-67. 
2. 	 Bcviuw "he did reveal unusual or exten­o Operational Log not any 
ur~x,, ircutm$s~nces which could have contributed to this failure. 
1. 	It is concluded from review of the above that the hole in the left 
Zhcultcr convo.ute was caused by continuous abraiding of th llinka!-

Patch and coraniute by the ridge of tho shoulder restraint cable 
conti__ '.c. r.ulred from cutting tha "hcnging" piece of c-.he 
coating off. 
2. 	 it is also ce-ci-A.de" that tbfis faiiuri. was nu..an induced as testing 
LJ:-o C.v. cfi at'" .s, cableI--. r',e holdar restraint coatin 
was ntted to u..7rciczng ,hu.,.Abnka Patch of the snoudur convolute, 
6o
 
6.3.2 Pre- and Post-Flight PGA Leakage History Summary 
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TABLE A9
 
P5E2 AND) POS'Gl!GST - - ASSOC:ATDT-UAGH, UIfS MU 
WITH APOLLO FLIGHT PRSSURE&GAPJIFT ASSEM.BLIES 
PLIGHTPG 
NU1',BI C NO. 
PREFT-IG{HT 
CC/NIa . 
-PA POSTFLIGHT 
CC/1N. 
Pk 
APOL.O 7 CD 
c-2 
R-7P 
A7L-OO4 
A7L-005 
A7L-006 
60 
90 
125 
90 
-00 
265 
APOLLO 8 CDE 
C, 
11W 
A7L-050 
A7L-037 
A7L-031 
60 
87 
55 
50 
35 
65 
APOLLO 9 CD 
C,-
LiMP 
A7L-020 
A7L-019 
A7L- 015 
90 
200* 
55 
54 
225 
53 
APOLIO 10 CD? 
SA7L-
iiI 
A7L-047 
043 
A7L-044 
60 
108 
60 
75 
75 
75 
APOLO 11 C'DR 
¢9. 
1L4 
A7L-056 
A7L-035 
A7L-077 
33 
6o 
95 
".2.7 
85 
115 
APOLLO 12 CDR 
GM.? 
11i4p 
A7L-065 
A7L-066 
A7L-06y 
mf5 
55 
51 
i8 
45 
APOLLO 13 0DR 
05d 
I1ip 
A71-078 
A7L-08b 
A7L-061 
8o 
130 
58 
** 
Flown on 14aiver Number 
Post test failure -
ric 8812-4}[-O240 
0'23952 
H*-E Data not available - PGi's yet to go post test. 
NOTE: All data taken at sea level ambient conditior using 02 with PGA 
pressurized to 5.75 psig. 
6.4 Contingency Equipment Use Study
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SM DISABLED IN TOTAL DURING TLI
 
April 23, 1970
 
Survival Possibilities - CM/LM Connected
 
1. 0xYy en System
 
(a) 	Design lightweight adapter bag to permit use of CM LiOH
 
canister with 14 02 umbil'icals.
 
(b) 	Redesign B5 and B6 attach points to accept stowage of OPS's.,
 
(c) 	Provide hardware to tee in two OPS's to three crewmen in case
 
of loss of pressure and oxygen in the CM.
 
(d) 	install hand regulator valves to adjust 02 flow from OPS's
 
and PLSS's.
 
2. 	Power System
 
(a) 	Spare battery capacity and si-ze required to fire SPS: The
 
solenoids are activated approximately five minutes prior co
 
engine ignition. This is a small power drain and it builds
 
up to approximately 40 amps'at ignition and maintains that
 
drain on the battery until shutdown:
 
The breakdown is as follows:
 
6 solenoid valves at I amp each = 6 amps
 
2 helium solenoid valves at" l- each = 3 amps
 
2 gimbal motors at 5 ampi each =10 amps
 
2 gimbal motors at 10 amps each =20 amps
 
1 pump gaging system at 2 amps = 2 amps 
Total amps required = 41 amps 
Voltage required is 28V DC 
The approximate size of the battery required to handle the 
load would not exceed 14" X 8" X 5" and would weigh on the 
order of 15 pounds. 
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The PLSS and OPS batteries would not be able to pffovide the
 
power required to fire the SPS.
 
The 	spare battery could be mounted in the SM and connected
 
to a switch on the display console in the CM. The switch
 
would have a 40-50 amp circuit breaker and plug connection
 
that could be used to plug in an extension.cable between the
 
CM and LM. This battery could also be used in the LM in-case
 
an emergency arose which would requ'ire power to fire the LM
 
descent engine or related LM electrical equipment.
 
(b) 	Provide electrical extension cable to reach from CM to LM
 
and special outlets in LM and CM to handle heavy current
 
drain (20 amp wire and breaker).
 
(c) 	Provide the capability to use ascent and/or descent batteries
 
Ior CM.
 
(d) Ut)ilize tape recorder batteries to power the penlights. FCSD
 
personnel 'emoved the recorder batteries from the power pack
 
and installed in the penlights.. The penlights were operated
 
for two hours without any noticeable drain on the batteries.
 
(e) Design holder and circuit connections for OPS and/or PLSS
 
batteries to use in the CM under extreme contingency conditions.
 
3. Crew Comfort
 
(a) 	Wear PGA's and fecal containment subsystem for body wa:-'mth.
 
(b) 	Stow thermal underwear for each astronaut.
 
(c) Redesign sleeping bags for warmth as well as restraining
 
capabilities. Also, insure adaptability to the.LM.
 
Cd) 	 Thermal (super insulation) blanket with capability to be
 
folded into small size.
 
(e) 	Provide sox and gloves for each astronaut.
 
4. Water System
 
(a) 	Cooling - (waste water)
 
(1) Maintain water level at 50% capacity and only dump
 
total capacity prior to SIM bay experiments.
 
(2) 	Power is not required for urine dump. The delta
 
pressure between the cabin (4.5 psia) and outside
 
vacuum is sufficient for dump purposes.
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(b) Drinking 
(1) Insert emergency hookup instructions and stow water line
 
required to connect water system from CM to LM.
 
Equipment required:
 
- CM water gun 
Tee adapter
 
Spare water line with proper
 
connectors (male/female)
 
Hand primer pump
 
(2) Three portable plastic water bags with approximately the
 
same capacity - (2 lbs.)/man. The bags could be designed
 
with two spouts - one for potable water and the other for
 
urine. The bags could be stowed for contingency and used
 
for either purpose at the discretion of the crew. Temporary
 
in-flight stowage of the bags with drinking water could be
 
on the bulkhead using beta straps. Mr. McAllister suggests
 
that the urine bags be strapped to the wire trays or on top
 
of the metal containers under the couches, but dumped at
 
the first opportunity.
 
During the Apollo 13 debriefing on April 21, 1970, the
 
crewA stated they saved all the urine and did not dump it
 
overboard. The reason the crew did not vent the urine
 
overboard was that they felt it would cause a change in
 
delta V or attitude to the S/C. After the mission, a
 
preliminary investigation showed it would not change the
 
S/C attitude or delta V to dump urine overboard from the
 
CM.
 
(3) Remove water from PLSS for contingency drinking water.
 
5. 	Tools
 
- Wire cutters
 
- Insulation tape 
- Adjustable or crescent wrenches 
- Twine 
6. 	Provide contingency information on the above applicable techniques/
 
procedures in the Flight Data File.
 
Prepared by: E. Rangel, D. Sedlak, P. Maceli
 
f. Daly, F. Parker
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MSC Apollo 13 Investigation Team
 
Prepared April 22, 1970 

Distributed April 22, 1970
 
NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION 
[MSC APOLLO 13 INVESTIGATION TEAM 
MANNED SPACECRAFT CENTER 
HOUSTON, TEXAS 77058 
REP.Y To 
ATTN OF: 
MEMORANDUM TO: PA/Leader, MSC Apollo 13 Investigation Team 
FROM :. PA/Chaimnn, Panel 5C, GFE 
SUBJECT : Scope of MSC Apollo 13 GFE Investigation Team Activities 
This team has had two meetings thus far. The primary objective of these 
two meetings has been to establish team members, the scope which this 
team should cover, define the mode of operation to be used for getting 
the investigation completed, and milestones established which lead to 
overall completion of the investigation. 
The current status of accomplishments of these objectives is as follows:
 
a. Team Member Designation - Completed. Transmitted to Leader,
 
Apollo 13 Investigation at 3:00 p.m., on April 20, 1970.
 
b. Scope of Investigation - Completed. This team will assemble the 
following information and investigate the following areas: 
(1) Compile a listing, with pertinent design data related
 
thereto, of all pressure vessels utilized in GFE (excluding GFE, ACE,
 
and GSE) and furnish this information to C. H. Perrine for use in his
 
detailed investigation of pressure vessels. This task is approximately
 
90% complete. The remaining data will be available on April 23, 1970.
 
(2) Review all flight GFE to determine all those items which
 
are presently designated as criticality Category I and to see if lower
 
category items should be upgraded to Category I. This review has been
 
made with the only Category I items being in the life support areas
 
(PLSS/OPS/fGA). 
(3) Restrict the detailed investigation to the life support
 
areas.
 
(4) Review the need for adding contingency type equipment to
 
the crew station and the feasibility of utilizing existing equipment for
 
uses other than those for which it was designed.
 
c. Mode of Operation - Completed. Failure mode and effects analyses 
are to be examined again for criticality. Rationale for acceptance of 
single point failures is to be reexamined. Any proposed changes in hardware 
design are to be reviewed and submitted to the CCP/CCB as applicable.
 
Feasibility for adding contingency type equipment and for utilizing
 
existing equipment for uses other than present design purposes will be
 
presented to the team, reviewed in detail, and passed on as applicable
 
for CCP/CCB action.
 
d. Milestones - The next meeting of this team will be at 11:00 a.m.
 
on April 23, 1970. At that time, the first look at the open items
 
previously specified will be reviewed and action assigned which will
 
hopefully lead to final investigation completion and report submittal
 
on or before May 1, 1970.
 
, ichard'S. Jbhton
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MSC Apollo Investigation Team 
Prepared, 4/21/70
 
Distributed. 4/22/70 
MSC Apollo Investigation Team 
Government Furnished Equipment 
Panel 5c 
April 20, 1970 
A meeting was held on April 20, 1970, to designate an Apollo 13 GFE in­
vestigation team and to establish the ground rules under which this inves­
tigation would operate. The following persons were in attendance: 
Chairman - R. S. Johnston 
Members - J., W. Thompson 
R. E. Smylie 
J. V. Correale 
D. F. Grimm 
D. G. Wiseman 
J. H. Langford 
E. iVI. Jones 
The GFE investigation team which was established at this meeting is as 
specified in the enclosure.. The mode of operation which this team should 
utilize was discussed with the following areas being designated as those which 
need particular emphasis. 
1: EMI 
a. PLSS 
b. OPS
 
c; -Suit
 
2. Life rafts and life vests 
3. Experiments (Those which could affect crew safety) 
4. Contingency equipment and the utilization of existing equipment for
 
uses other than those for which it was primarily designed.
 
It was agreed that the complete list of GFE (excluding G&N, ACE and GSE) 
would be reviewed and evaluated from the following aspects: 
1. Criticality categorization (Category I, II or III) 
a. Determine whether present categorization is correct 
b. Rationale for acceptance of present categorization 
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2. Failure mode and effects analysis 
a. Single point failures 
3. Corrective action 
a. Impact 
4. Recommended new design criteria 
5. Inflight maintenance (Tools) 
a. OPS oxygen for CM/LM use 
b. PLSS water for drinking purposes 
c. Use of batteries for multiple purposes 
The following action items were assigned in the subject meeting: 
1. Compile complete list of GFE showing present criticality categories 
assigned. Action. - J. W. Thompson. 
2. Furnish Mr, J. W. Thompson a list of all GFE for which FMEA's 
are available so that they can be incorporated into preceding item 1. 
Action. - R&QA. 
3. Identify all GFE which utilizes s'elf-contained pressure vessels. 
Action. - CSD, FCSD, LSPO and LOEPO. 
4. Transmit copies of all GFE FMEA's to Mr.. J. Thompson. Action. -
R&QA. 
The next meeting of this team is scheduled for, 11:00 a.m. on April 21, 1970, 
At this meeting, a more detailed plan of action for the investigation will be 
formulated. A daily meeting of this team will be held with the time being 
established at the April 21 meeting. 
ichar . Johliston 
/XChairman. GtE Panel 
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MSC Apollo 13 Investigation Team 
Panel 5c, Government Furnished Equipment 
April 21, 1970 
Meeting No. 2 
The second meeting of the Apollo 13 GFE investigation team was held at 
11:00 a. m. on April 21, 1970. Attendees are listed on the attached page. 
The current status of the investigation was discussed and a review of action 
items from the April 20, 1970, meeting was made. All action items from 
the April 20 meeting are completed, except for item 4 which should be com­
plete by April 22, 1970. 
It was determined that the only criticability Category I items presently identi­
fied in the GFE area are the space suits, PLSS and OPS. Category II and 
III items are being further examined to determine if any of these should be 
upgraded to Category I. 
The following action items were assigned: 
1. Review FMEA's for all Category I items and present a detailed listing 
of the single point failures and the rationale for accepting these in the present 
configuration flight hardware. Action. - CSD to complete by 11:00 a. in. 
April 23, 1970. 
2. Compile a listing of all GFE with self-contained pressure vessels 
and submit to ASPO Systems Engineering Division on April 21, 1970. Listings 
of these items are attached., Action. - J. W. Thompson. 
3. Review contingency usage of existing GFE for purposes other than those 
for which it was designed and tool requirements for implementing such usage. 
Status of this review to be nade at the next team meeting. Action. - J. Thompson. 
The next meeting of this team will be held at 11:00 a. m., April 23, 1970, in 
building 2, room 763. 
nstonS. Jich 
Chairman FE Panel 5c 
Experiment Criticality I FMEA Pressure Vessel 
Gamma Ray Spectrometer No Completed None 
X-Ray/Alpha Spectrometer No Completed None
 
Mass Spectrometer No In MSC Review None
 
Panoramic Camera No Being Revised None*
 
Mapping Camera No Being Revised None***
 
Laser Altimeter No Being Revised None**
 
IR Scanning Radiometer No Required by RFP None
 
Far UV Spectrometer No Required by RFP None
 
Subsatellite No Required by RFP Batteries
 
*Contains N2 plumbing. Maximum pressure is 28 PSIG in camera. N2 supply provided by NR as CFE. 
**Laser head contains one atmosphere of N2 . Volume is approximately 15 cubic inches. 
***May require N 2 supply. If so, will utilize same supply as panoramic camera. 
LIST OF PRESSURE VESSELS 
EXP - SUBSYSTEM - CONTRACTOR APPROX GAS DESIGN-PROOF WORKING RELIEF VALVE nMA FLT 
COMPOENT !DIM I PRESSURE PRESSURE PRESSURE AVAIL ASSIGN 
PSE Caging Syst BxA 1.6 in3 i 10% Helium 1000 PSI 333 PSI I None All 
Nitrogen 
PSE Outer Case BxA Die 10.75 Air Ambient None All 
16.5" long 
SRC's 2 22xl8xlO Vcu 5PI 
Sli2 15 PSI 
LGEC (case) Goerz Nitrogen Ambient 
Rtg Fuel Element AEC 2 die x 
18" 
Helium Ambient 
i 
0 PSafterAl 
Eyears 
Yes All 
2^6.0 
Rtg GE 20.x D Trace &helium 14.7 PSI @ambient 2.5 PSI @1100F (NoneStatic) Yes All 
_____________a Araon 
Drill (Bat Cell) Martin 5x5x8 I Nitrogen PSI 
Drill Power Head Martin 14x8 Dia Nitrogen 15+2 PSI 
-4) 
LIST OF PRESSURE VESSELS
 
CREW SUPPORT 
EQUIP. COMPONENT 
PISS 02 Tank 
PLSS H20 Tank 
01S 02 Tank 
Life Vest CO2
 
Cart. 
Life Raft CO2
 
Cart.
 
CONTRACTOR APPROX. GAS DESIGN PROOF WORKING RELIEF MATERIAL 
DIMENS. PRESSURE PRESSURE VALVE 
PRESSURE 
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NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION 
MSC APOLLO 13 INVESTIGATION TEAM 
MANNED SPACECRAFT CENTER 
HOUSTON, TEXAS 77058-
REPLY TO 
ATTN OF: 
MSC Apollo 13 Investigation Tam
 
Panel 5c, Government Furnished Equipment
 
April 23, 1970
 
Meeting No. 3
 
The third meeting of the Apollo 13 GFE Investigation Panel was held at
 
11:00 a.m., on April 23: 1970. Attendees are listed on the attachment.
 
Action items from all previous meetings were reviewed and all have been
 
completed. A detailed report from Crew Systems Division was made by
 
Mr. J. V. Correale, in which all criticabity Category I items were
 
discussed. All these items are within the life support systems (PGA/
 
PzSS/oPS). The Failure Mode and Effect Analyses for these systems were
 
reviewed and the rationale for acceptance of all single point failures
 
therein was presented. No recommendations for hardware design changes
 
were made. All memebers of the Panel were in agreement with this. A
 
copy of this report will be included in the interim report.
 
All GFE pressure vessel data have been given to MSC Apollo 13 Investigation
 
Panel 6 for their use in the overall investigation of related system
 
pressure vessels.
 
A listing of possible flight contingency equipment to be added to Apollo
 
missions and utilization of existing equipment for uses other than those
 
for which it was primarily designed was presented to the Panel for
 
consideration. It was decided that this information would be transmitted
 
to Panel 6 for its investigation and implementation as applicable.
 
The investigation assigned to Panel 5c is now considered to be complete
 
pending further requirements imposed by the Investigation Board and/or
 
other Investigation Panels. An interim report is now being complied and
 
will be ready for distribution by May 1, 1970. If no further action is
 
required by either the Investigation Board or other Panels, the interim
 
report will be redesignated as the final report.
 
NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION 
MANNED SPACECRAFT CENTER 
HOUSTON, TEXAS 77058 
IN REPLY REFER TO. PG/MFll-70 	 PQ 4 P70 
MEMOANDUM TO: 	 PD/Chief, Systems Engineering Division
 
FROM : 	PA/Manager for Experiments and GFE
 
Apollo Spacecraft Program
 
SUBJECT : 	 Data transmittal from GFE Investigation Team 
The enclosed notes provide the results of a preliminary investigation
 
into contingency GFE usage-.
 
Similarly, data relative to GFE pressure vessel types and basic charac­
teristis have been transmitted to PD4/. Ward. No further effort -will
 
be expended in this area by this office unless you require specific data.
 
Requests for further information may be made through PG15/. W. Thompson,
 
extension 4350.
 
chard S. Jdhinst 	 _ 
Enclosure
 
cc: 
PD4/J. Sevier
 
PD4/E. Ward
 
Pgl5:JWThompson(JJFeriell, Boeing) :gjw 4-24-70 
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SM DISABLED IN TOTAL DURING TLI
 
April 23, 1970
 
Survival Possibilities - CM/IM Connected
 
1. OxSy -11 3 tem 
(a) 	Design lightweight adapter bag to permit use of CM LiOl
 
canister with LM 02 umbilicals.
 
(b) 	Redesign B5 and B6 attach points to accept stowage of OPS's.
 
(c) 	Provide hardware to tee in two OPS's to three crewmen in case
 
of loss of pressure and oxygen in the CM.
 
(d) 	Install hand regulator valves to adjust 02 flow lirom OPS's
 
and PLSS's.
 
2. 	Power System
 
(a) 	Spare battery capacity and size required to fire SPS: The
 
solenoids are activated approximately five minutes prior to
 
engine ignition. This is a small power drain and it builds
 
up to approximately 40 amps at ignition and maintains that 
drain on the battery until shutdown'. 
The breakdown is as follows: 
6 solenoid valves at I amp each = 6 amps 
2 helium solenoid valves at 11 each = 3 amps 
2 gimbal motors at 5 amps each =10 amps 
2 gimbal motors at 10 amps each =20 amps 
I pump gaging system at 2 amps = 2 amps 
Total amps required = 41 amps 
Voltage required is 28V DC
 
The approximate size of the battery required to handle the
 
load would not exceed 14" X 8" X 5" and would weigh on the
 
order of 15 pounds.
 
The 	PILSS and OPS batteries would not be able to provide the
 
power required to fire the SPS.
 
The spare battery could be mounted in the SM and connected
 
to a switch on the display console in the CM. The switch
 
would have a 40-50 amp circuit breaker and plug connection
 
that could be used to plug in an extension cable between the
 
CM and LM. This battery could also be used in the LM in case
 
an emergency arose which would requi.re power to fire the LM
 
descent engine or related LM electrical equipment.
 
(b) 	Provide electrical extension cable to reach from CM to LM
 
and special outlets in LM and CM to handle heavy current
 
drain (20 amp wire and breaker).
 
(c) 	Provide the capability to use ascent and/or descent batteries
 
for CM.
 
(c) 	Uti'lize ta *e recorder batteries to power the penlights. FCSD
 
.personnel removed the recorder batteries from the power pack
 
and installed in the penlights. The penlights were operated
 
for two hours without any noticeable drain on the batteries.
 
(e) 	Design holder and Uircuit connections for OPS and/or PLSS
 
batteries to use in the CM under extreme contingency conditions.
 
3. 	Crew Comfort
 
(a) 	Wear PGA's end fecal containment subsystem for body warmth.
 
(b) 	Stow thermal underwear for each astronaut.
 
(c) 	Redesign sleeping, bags for warmth as well as restraining
 
capabilities. Also, insure adaptability to the LM.
 
(d) 	Thermal (super insulation) blanket with capability to be
 
folded into small size.
 
(e) 	Provide sox and gloves for each astronaut.
 
4. Water System
 
(a) 	Cooling - (waste water)
 
(1) 	Maintain water level at 50% capacity and only dump
 
total capacity prior to SIM bay experiments.
 
(2) 	Power is not required for urine dump. The delta
 
pressure between the cabin (4.5 psia) and outside
 
vacuum is sufficient for dump purposes.
 
79 
(b) 	Drinking
 
(1) 	Insert emergency hookup instructions and stow water li-ne
 
required to connect water system from CM to LM.
 
Equipment required:
 
- CM water gun
 
- Tee adapter
 
- Spare water line with proper
 
connectors (male/female)
 
- Hand primer pump
 
(2) Three portable plastic water bags with approximately the
 
same capacity - (2 lbs,)/man. The bags could be designed
 
with two spouts - one for potable water andthe othe' for
 
urine. The bags could be stowed for contingency and Msed
 
for either purpose at the discretion of the crew. Temporary
 
in-flight stowage of the bags with drinking water could be
 
on the bulkhead using beta straps. Mr. McAllister suggests

that the urine bags be strapped to the wire trays or on top
 
of the metal containers under the couches, but dumped at
 
the first opportunity.
 
During the Apollo 13 debriefing on-April 21, 1970, the
 
crew 	stated they saved all the urine and did not dump it
 
overboard. The reason the crew did not vent the urine
 
overboard was that they felt it would caise a change in
 
delra V or attitude to the S/C. After the mission, a
 
preliminary investigation showed it would not changethe
 
S/C 	attitude or delta V to dump urine overboard from the
 
CM.
 
(3) Remove water from PLSS for contingency drinking water.
 
5. 	Tools
 
- Wire cutters 
- Insulation tape 
- Adjustable or cresrent wrenches 
- Twine 
6. 	Provide contingency information on the above appl.icable techniques/
 
procedures in the Flight Data File.
 
Prepared by: E. Rangel, D. Sedlak, P. Maceli
 
R. Daly, F. Parker
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